From independent Ukraine’s earliest days in the post-Soviet world right up to the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine deservedly owned its reputation as an “oligarch state.” In fact, it was one of the most egregious of its type in Eastern Europe, and it burdened Ukraine over decades.

A handful of super-wealthy tycoons not only owned vast holdings in sectors such as energy production, industry, and mining but also presided over media empires and spent liberally to have politicians—sometimes whole parties—and judges, too, in their pockets. They typically also engaged in prodigious corruption and crime, and enjoyed free rein in gray-economy fields such as prostitution and gambling.

Ukraine’s oligarchic blight was often cited to smear its legitimacy as a country, much less as a prospective EU member. And because the Ukrainian state accepted these oligarchs as partners, it undermined ordinary Ukrainians’ trust in their leadership—and politics as such. The 2013-14 Revolution of Dignity initiated a slew of legislation designed to rein in the oligarchs and stymie corruption, but that truncated rather than eviscerated the scourge.

In the 2019 presidential election, Volodymyr Zelensky beat out confectionary magnate Petro Poroshenko, an oligarch himself, foregrounding his own background as a media professional, rather than a captain of industry, and a straightshooter who embodied the “de-oligarchization” of politics. Yet Zelensky, too, has struggled to end the influence of oligarchs.

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, he sought their largesse and effectively legitimized their clout by agreeing to treat them as philanthropists. Before Biden administration criteria for sidelining the billionaires from politics—as a condition for U.S. aid—went into effect, Russian troops began massing on Ukraine’s borders in late 2021, and the measures petered out.

But full-scale war has done what neither homegrown regulators nor international prodding could: clip the most powerful oligarchs at the knees, destroying some and severely weakening others. “They’ve been definitely sidelined over the last four years,” said Dmytro Kisilenko, a Ukrainian defense sector economist. “Some still have power through their businesses, but their power in politics and media has been cut off and is less each year.”

“The key structural assets of all oligarchs were partially either destroyed or are currently under attack,” said Tetiana Shevchuk of the Kyiv-based Anti-Corruption Action Centre. Russia seized the Donbas industries that constituted the backbone of heavy hitters such as Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest man, who lost vast assets in Donbas and Mariupol—as many as 70 companies—as a result of Russian occupation and destruction. “Instead of profits, they bear losses,” Shevchuk said. Akhmetov’s fortune was cut in half after the invasion: from nearly $14 billion to now $7 billion.

Moreover, with the wartime media so firmly in government hand and martial law in place, Shevchuk, like Kisilenko, believes that oligarch clout is at an all-time low. With most public political activity suspended, the oligarchs lost their forum for domestic political rivalry. “They cannot be influential at the time through the usual political instruments,” Shevchuk said. “All the decision-making is happening in Zelensky’s cabinet.”

Martial law implicitly undercut their powers, and the war thinned their numbers. The pro-Kremlin business oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk was arrested and then traded to Russia. The likes of Igor Abramovich and Vadym Stolar—pro-Russian moguls with their fingers in politics—exiled themselves to Russia or the French Riviera. In 2023, the Ukrainian security services arrested infamous Israeli Ukrainian tycoon Ihor Kolomoisky for money laundering and fraud. Gas mogul Dmytro Firtash is currently sitting in an Austrian prison.

Media holdings that had been central to the oligarchs’ empires are now largely in the hands of the state. In 2022, Kyiv initiated a joint news program known as the United News telethon that is produced by a mix of state-owned and private media groups, the latter including oligarch-owned stations. In addition, the owners’ control of broadcasting content has been further weakened through wartime legal regulations. These changes caused Akhmetov to shut down his media empire, Media Group Ukraine, completely.

This series of events, so tragic for Ukraine in so many ways, has the country more oligarch-free than at any time since its independence in 1991. “Ukraine is no longer an oligarch state,” Kisilenko said.

Zelensky’s approach, though, has not attempted to deprive the remaining, Ukraine-loyal oligarchs of all their power and assets. The war has demanded their fortunes and pull—and Zelensky has sought to leverage it by recasting oligarchs as conditional allies rather than independent power centers. The president demanded financial support for the war effort and political loyalty; noncompliance meant the seizure of assets and prosecution.

The two highest-profile pro-government oligarchs are Akhmetov and Victor Pinchuk. Since the full invasion, Akhmetov and his companies have shelled out around $368 million in support for Ukraine’s military and civilians. His Steel Front program fortified Ukraine’s defense capabilities by creating and donating steel fortifications, armored shields for vehicles, and drones to the front line. His company Metinvest produces and supplies anti-drone shields for T-64, T-72, and Abrams tanks, alongside armored plates for bulletproof vests and specialized shields for Patriot air defense systems. Another product: prefabricated steel underground shelters, known as kryivka.

Pinchuk, an industrialist who built his fortune in the steel pipe industry, has since 2022 positioned himself as a pro-Western philanthropist and diplomatic bridge for the administration. The Victor Pinchuk Foundation’s causes are the long-term recovery of afflicted veterans and other diverse humanitarian relief. His Recovery project entails a network of 19 innovative rehabilitation centers that provide free, high-tech physical rehabilitation for wounded soldiers, including complex prosthetics and specialized multidisciplinary care. In addition, the foundation opened mental health centers across Ukraine to provide professional psychological support to thousands of military personnel and their families.

Those who didn’t play ball suffered the consequences. This happened to Kolomoisky, who went from hero to zero: In 2014, his monies rescued the Dnipropetrovsk canton from Russian invaders, but in 2022, he failed to condemn the Russian invasion and ante up the way Akhmetov and Pinchuk did.

Anti-corruption campaigners say Zelensky has not prioritized a revamping of the state’s justice system and economy in ways that would undercut the oligarchs for good.

“We have a unique moment right now to change the balance and to fight the oligarchs, to change the system,” said Shevchuk, which she sees being squandered. “This would take a lot of political capital in normal times,” she added, but right now, it could happen without backlash. Top of the list for Ukraine’s anti-corruption campaigners is enforcing the U.S.-inspired anti-oligarch law, strengthening the independent anti-corruption institutions, and implementing judicial reform to ensure accountability. They want to make privatization transparent, break up media monopolies, and preempt state capture occurring when postwar reconstruction commences.

Otherwise, the oligarchs—including new ones from the precocious defense industry—will arise after the war and burden Ukraine again, for years to come.