The Washington Huskies returned home to Husky Stadium with some momentum as they took on the Penn State Nittany Lions. Unfortunately said momentum from last game did not travel with them from Nebraska, as the offense stuttered out the gates yet again but now this time with the defense looking all out of sorts. UW quickly found themselves down 28-6 at halftime but flipped the switch in the second half. The defense was able to get timely 3-and-outs and the offense came to life, scoring 19 points unanswered. However it was too little too late, as they were unable to get one last stop to get a chance to tie / take the lead – which included a 12 men on the field penalty on a 3rd down coming out of a timeout. The frustrating season continues as the Dawgs take 1 step forward and 2 steps immediately back.
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To the film.
I feel like a broken record. Offense had a slow start. Demond seemed out of rhythm. The run game stalled out too frequently. Miscues and questionable situational play calling dig us into an even deeper hole. Finally, some late off script playmaking and a few wrinkles no one saw in the first half give us just enough hope to let us get fooled into thinking we had a chance in a game that was far more lopsided than the final score would suggest.
Just in the first half, we’d end up going 3 & out on 4/6 of our first half possessions. On the two first half possessions where we actually got a first down, the 92 of the 127 yards gained were on Jayden Limar runs, receptions, or defensive penalty yardage on a play where Limar got the ball. Basically, our offense was completely dysfunctional in the first half when Limar didn’t get the ball. How is it possible that we go from decent to completely impotent on offense when we have to sub out one player?
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Generally, we try to stay positive here on Film Study. We’ll call it like we see it, but pinning blame isn’t our intent. We’ve spent most of this season focusing on offensive scheme fit, identifying the miscues, and a lot of time trying to make sense of Demond’s regression. This game got us really thinking about coaching decisions though. We’re talking about playing time/rotations, big picture game planning, and situational play calling. We’ve given Jedd Fisch a lot of slack on those things this season because there have been other, more easily explainable reasons why things weren’t clicking, but by this point in the season, we are who we are as a team. It’s up to the staff to understand that and figure out how to win. We’re going to focus on plays from the first half that stood out for one reason or another and got us thinking about those questions.
1st Quarter – 4:28 – 1st & 10
First up we have this big TFL on a Jet Sweep during the second UW possession of the game. This was the first of three straight 3 & outs, and this got us thinking about our personnel usage. Jet Sweep is a staple constraint play that we’ve seen Fisch call repeatedly over the years. It’s one of just a few staple outside run concepts we carry in the offense, it pairs nicely with some of the Zone run looks we run, and it helps get our speedy WRs involved in the game plan.
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Jet Sweep is all about out leveraging the opponent at the point of attack. Sometimes we do that by using a lead blocker out of the backfield. Other times, we use extra blockers attached to the formation to outflank the defense, like we try to do here with Decker DeGraaf (#86, TE) and Chris Lawson (#8, WR) on the right side of the formation. The way we run Jet Sweep, if we add blockers to the end of the line, and the defense doesn’t bump out their play side EDGE, then we leave that EDGE unblocked to get extra bodies down field to set up the run. The thinking is that the Jet Sweep ball carrier should have enough speed at the snap that he can beat the unblocked EDGE to the edge. That ball carrier vs. EDGE matchup is supposed to be the riskiest part of the play, and it’s one that we usually win.
Where this play went wrong is the backfield penetration that got let in outside of that EDGE. The whole point of leaving the EDGE unblocked is to allow extra blockers to get down field and prevent that from happening. Decker (6-4, 250) has no business getting blown up by PSU’s freshman nickel DB who’s listed at 6-2, 205 lbs. This play wouldn’t have stood out if this was a one off miss by DeGraaf, but he’s consistently disappointed as a blocker this season. He’s never been a great blocker, but even as a bulked up third year player, he hasn’t become a serviceable blocker. He may be the best receiver in the TE room (although I’m less sure about that now after Naone’s flashed a few times this season), but he isn’t so good that it makes up for his lesser blocking abilities. Naone is much more well-rounded as a TE, and I’d be willing to see more of Kade Eldridge as TE2 based on his ability to block, catch, and run in limited reps. I just don’t understand why we continue to put Decker in key positions to make a block when we know he’s a liability there. Play your best players, and if you can’t, feature the guys you have in ways that suit their abilities.
2nd Quarter – 13:22 – 3rd & 3
Okay, this one is simple, and Fisch even talked about this in his weekly press conference. This pass was supposed to go to the right side of the field. The back shoulder throw to Lawson might’ve been a favorable match up in theory, but it’s another example of poor situational awareness by Demond.
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On this play design, Lawson is a match up alert route, but he’s not supposed to be the primary read. The right side of the formation has a Stick concept called. The two slot receivers to the right are the primary read on Stick. You either throw the Out route or you throw to the inside slot receiver who has a Stick/Out option depending on the coverage. We even have the two slot receivers running a switch release to free up more space for their routes to get open with. It’s 3rd & 3, so either of the Stick concept routes would’ve gotten us the first down yardage. Demond even likes those types of perimeter out-breaking routes. Rashid Williams (#3, WR) was open on his Out route for the first down. I just don’t get Demond feels the need to play hero ball in a situation like this, and it’s an example of his inability to play within the system and allow the system to take the burden off of him.
2nd Quarter – 11:22 – 1st & 10
The next three plays are from the same 3 & out possession backed up deep in our own territory. I could go on and on about Demond’s read and our execution of these three plays, but I wanted to focus on the situational play calls themselves. We start off on our own 2-yard line. Our run game is questionable enough where I kind of understand the hesitancy to go with the conventional run call here to get breathing room. What I don’t get is why these are the pass calls we went with.
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We have a Verts Juke concept called here with a Sluggo (Slant-Go) double move from Jordan Clay (#11, WR) to the far right of the formation. The play is designed to be a shot play to Clay’s double move, and if that’s not there, the Juke route to Roebuck in the right side slot is supposed to give Demond a good underneath match up. To me, this call doesn’t make a ton of sense situationally. For starters, if we’re worried enough about blocking near our own goal line that we didn’t want to run, then why are we calling a long developing pass play? Second, what about the defense made us think that a shot play here would be successful? The DBs are backed up giving big cushions. A quick pass to stay ahead of the sticks, get some breathing room, and allow for a potential second down run (which had been working with Limar) could’ve set up a third and manageable.
2nd Quarter – 11:17 – 2nd & 10
Well, if it doesn’t work the first time, try, try again. We again go for a down field pass play, and again Demond opts to throw a 50/50 ball to Jordan Clay. We have a Verts concept called again that does little schematically to help give Demond easy access throws that’ll set up 3rd & manageable. Basically, if the WRs don’t beat their defender, no one will get open. After Demond’s struggles this season, as well as Fisch’s favorite excuse of this being a young team, why are we calling plays that force Demond to make tough throws to young players? And why are we doing it when we’re in the part of the field where Demond has the least amount of space to buy himself time?
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2nd Quarter – 11:12 – 3rd & 10
Well you look at that? I guess chucking the ball downfield on low percentage throws on first and second down deep in your own territory can set up a really inconvenient situation on third down. Now you’re forced to throw the ball deep if you want any shot at picking up the first down, and the coverage will be ready for it. The defense also knows they can probably pin their ears back on the rush because you’re likely to throw the ball. This dials up the pressure while we again give Demond no immediate dump off options. Demond does what he does, scramble when the first read isn’t there, and he nearly gets sacked for a safety (honestly, I thought this should’ve been intentional grounding). Fisch might have limitless confidence in Demond, but at this point in the possession, he’s done nothing to give him (or the offense) a chance.
If Fisch wants to stress playing “Big Ten Football” then he has to coach it like he belongs in the Big Ten. Don’t get cute or greedy in your play calling. Get yards, stay ahead of the sticks, and don’t take unnecessary risks in your situational play calling. Figure out the run game. If the run game doesn’t work, find ways to create extensions to the run game (i.e. quick passing, screens, QB run, option, etc.). If your QB can’t figure it out, then maybe go with the one who can do so.
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If the defensive performance against Nebraska was at or near the ceiling of what this defense is capable of, the performance against Penn State was closer to the mean. This 2026 Huskies team is not good about starting fast, and the defense yet again took its lumps in the first half before settling down and pitching a shutout second half. While we’ve been able to get away with that type of slow start a few times, one bad quarter of play can be enough to lose a game in conference play. That’s what happened against Penn State.
Probably the most frustrating parts of the game for Husky fans were our inability to capitalize on favorable situations on defense and a handful of big plays that appeared to be blow coverages. Basically, if our offense isn’t going to be winning shootouts, the defense needs to at least make it hard on the opposing offense. There is no margin for error. This week, these two plays were specially requested by one of our UWDP writers because it really did seem too easy for PSU’s offense. And while I agree with that general statement, what went wrong on the play isn’t always as obvious as it looks on TV.
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1st Quarter – 7:41 – 2nd & 17
[Completion against backed up Dylan Robinson]
Backed up well behind the sticks after a botched snap on first down, and deep in their own territory, Penn State is in a clear passing situation. Given the field position, our defense can afford to give up some yardage on second and third down without worrying about a potential fourth down attempt. This is where Walters can dial up his creative zone blitz packages and get us a stop. The one thing we can’t afford right here is to give up a 12+ yard gain that would set up third and manageable. Unfortunately, we give up 14 yards here. The easy knee jerk reaction is to blame Dylan Robinson, the CB lined up over the WR that made the play, or the play call giving the WR a huge seven yard cushion to work with. However, that’s not really where this play went wrong.
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With PSU lining up in 12 personnel (1 RB, 2 TEs) out of a Full House formation, the primary threats downfield are just the two WRs on the perimeter. Against this, Walters calls a zone blitz out of our Mug front with a disguised Cover 3 to back it up. Part of the coverage disguise is a post-snap rotation of RDA (lined up deep pre-snap) into the flat and McLaughlin (lined up near the LOS pre-snap) bailing into deep center field coverage.
When we run our zone blitzes, our zone coverage tends to function more like old school “spot drop” zone coverage where defenders are dropping to a spot on the field and are defending space rather than using pattern matching rules like a lot of modern defenses use in their base coverages. In this style, the underneath zone defenders are looking to read the eyes of the QB to guide them towards the intended target. Of course, the defenders are also coached to read the offense pre-snap to find clues about the possible routes, primary receiving threats, and how to develop a pre-snap game plan on how to play their role within the coverage.
In this version of Cover 3 where both CBs are dropping into deep coverage, that deep coverage assignment is their number one priority. There is no help over the top or to the sidelines, so if they need to give a cushion and still bail deep to ensure that space is covered, as Dylan Robinson (#6, CB) did, then so be it. That’s not to say that we’re giving away that easy yardage by design though. The underneath flat zone defenders, in this case Rylon Dillard-Allen (#4, S), is supposed to be providing the underneath help to prevent that. RDA’s assignment as the flat defender in this long down and distance situation was likely to sink with the outside vertical threat, squeeze the passing window between himself and Robinson behind him, but keep an eye on the backfield in case one of the three backs leaked into the flat where he would need to rally to make an underneath tackle.
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Where this went wrong is when RDA got lost in space. At the snap he takes a few steps up along the hash but loses track of the outside WR. He then flips around trying to relocate the WR before getting eyes back on the backfield, but by that point he’s out of position in no man’s land. He’s too far inside to make a play on the WR, and he’s too far back and to the inside to make a play on the ball. Even if you don’t know what the coverage call is in real time, you can probably tell that it’s zone coverage, and when we’ve got two zone defenders within three yards of each other (like RDA and ZRS here), someone’s probably out of position.
2nd Quarter – 14:48 – 3rd & 10
On this play, Rashawn Clark is the easy target to blame for the TD, but again it’s not quite as simple as it seems. Again we’re in a clear passing situation, but this time we decide to go with a coverage call instead of pressure. We’ve got a Cover 1 Lurk dialed up here with a single deep center field safety, a standard four man rush, a LB playing zone over the middle (the lurker) to take away crossing routes and/or play quasi-spy, and man coverage everywhere else.
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In Cover 1, especially when we’re playing press man technique like we are here, the man coverage defenders are taught to play outside leverage (i.e. line up slightly to the outside of their receiver). By cheating to the outside, they are able to use their alignment to gain an immediate position advantage over outbreaking routes because the receiver would need to run through them to get to their spot. Inside leverage, by comparison, would be lining up to the inside of the receiver to better takeaway in-breaking routes. So you might ask yourself, why would you teach outside leverage for Cover 1? You want outside leverage because in Cover 1, and especially Cover 1 Lurk, you’re supposed to have coverage help to the inside. In Cover 1 Lurk, that inside coverage help is coming from the deep center field safety AND the lurker LB underneath. By comparison, the only help they have on the outside is the sideline.
The challenge the defense faced on this play was the offensive formation. PSU is lined up in a 3×1 formation into the boundary (FIB) where they have their three receivers towards the boundary side. We’ve talked about FIB designs several times on Film Study, and I’m a fan of them (when speaking from an offensive perspective) because they force the defense into making challenging decisions with their coverage. Defenses always want to have one more defender than the offense has receivers on the field side because of all the extra space there is to cover. Conventional 3×1 formations are already hard enough to play 1-high safety coverages against because of these spacing and numbers principles, but FIB designs take it a step further.
If we’re going to play Cover 1 against a FIB look and still get at least some sort of +1 coverage advantage over the field side of the formation, we need to cheat our deep safety over towards the field side. From the offense’s perspective, if you know that’s going to be the defense’s reaction, then you can pick on the safety. The deep safety is everyone’s help over the middle deep, but that safety can only cover so much ground. If the offense sends two vertical routes from far ends of the field, one of them should be open.
As you can see more clearly from the replay angle, RDA is lined up way out wide towards the field side, nearly out of the screen at the snap. Worried that he won’t be able to give support to either side of the field, he immediately flows further towards the isolated field WR and takes himself completely out of position to help Clark on the boundary side. Clark doesn’t have a good rep of man coverage here, but I do give him a pass on giving up the inside release because I think he should’ve had some amount of inside help from RDA. If RDA had dropped vertically instead of heading further towards the field, he might’ve still gotten beat for the TD. However, there’s a good chance that he’d be able to contest the pass or force a tougher throw over the top instead of a inside-led pass into the space that he vacated.
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A couple of other notes I had from my Film Study prep:
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12 players on the field after a timeout with the game on the line is absolutely unacceptable. What are we getting for over $10 million a year if we can’t get the basics figured out? Penalties have been a recurring problem this season, and I think it’s fair to say that they’ve probably cost us a game or two in aggregate. This penalty from the last drive was probably the most obvious example this season. It’s ironic that this was also one of our least penalized performances this season.
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I don’t have any numbers to back this up, but I’m seeing a trend where our defense struggles against offenses that have quality TE play. Minnesota, Iowa, and Penn State have all had TEs who were good blockers, and while not all of them have featured their TEs in the pass game, their impact in the run game has been enough to get our defense off balance. We’ve been successful against the run when our DBs can rally to the ball before the RBs get out into space. When they start to reach and play too aggressively against the run, or otherwise overreact to soft spots in the defense, guys start to get out of position. They try to do too much. That’s what we saw from RDA on these plays above, and that’s what we’ve seen in the past from McLaughlin and Clark at times too.
This week’s honors goes to Demond Williams Jr reminding fans about the type of electric plays we grew accustomed to and gave us hope for this season, before certain things in the offseason happened.
