When the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran began on Feb. 28, Israel looked very much like the regional power—possibly even the great power—that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed it was. There were few reasons to doubt him. Over the previous two-and-a-half years, Israel had seemingly vanquished Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, its bitterest enemies. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had shown that it could wage lengthy campaigns, demonstrated impressive technical abilities like the pager attack on Hezbollah, and projected power across the region in attacks on Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. Now, it was embarking on what Netanyahu marketed as a war to end all wars, a final blow to eliminate the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile threat.

Six weeks later, Iran’s military capabilities have been seriously degraded, its economy is in tatters, key infrastructure has been destroyed, and much of its key political and military leadership is dead. But the goals that Netanyahu and Trump had set out when they launched the operation are far from met: The regime is still in power, possesses enriched uranium, and reportedly retains a large stock of ballistic missiles and drones. Most seriously of all, Iran has shown that it can close the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has put up a far better fight than Israel expected and shows no inclination to disarm.

So, did the war leave Israel weaker or stronger than before? This is a critical question because even as Netanyahu spins the Iran war as an immense victory, he is also saying that the fight is far from over. “We still have goals to complete, and we will achieve them either by agreement or by the resumption of fighting. … Our finger is on the trigger,” he said last week in response to the cease-fire declared by U.S. President Donald Trump.

The answer to the question about Israel’s postwar strength partly lies with Iran and Hezbollah. The extent of their losses and their ability to recover and rebuild will likely only emerge over time, an ambiguity that only makes Israel’s strategic challenges more complex. On the other hand, Israel’s assets and abilities are far easier to assess, and the situation is not very encouraging.

Israeli strength stands principally on three legs: its raw military power, the ability of its economy and people to support increasingly costly and open-ended wars, and its alliance with the United States. In all three areas, Netanyahu has pushed these assets to their limits and seems to be demanding even more.

The army: On a purely tactical level, the Israeli defense establishment has scored many impressive achievements since Hamas’s attack on Oct. 7, 2023, but they have been achieved at a huge expenditure of arms, manpower, and money. All told, the Bank of Israel has estimated that even before the current war with Iran and Hezbollah started, the other wars had cost Israel’s $660 billion economy around $116 billion in direct defense spending. The cost of the current assault on Iran is subject to dispute, but estimates range between $11 billion and $18 billion.

Even if the operations in Iran and Lebanon end soon, Israel’s defense costs will remain high. The army continues to deploy troops in half of Gaza and in large swathes of southern Syria. More soldiers have been dispatched to the West Bank to protect scores of new settlements. While Netanyahu has reluctantly acceded to negotiations with Lebanon, he has also talked about establishing a so-called security zone in south Lebanon that will require even more boots on the ground. He has expressed no interest in pulling back from anywhere, saying last month, “We changed our security concept. We are the ones who attack and initiate, and we are the ones who surprise our enemies.”

The Israeli government treats the army as if its resources are unlimited, calling on it to undertake new offensives and extended occupations. But it has done nothing to ensure it has enough personnel to cover them. Bills to extend mandatory service or end the exemption from conscription enjoyed by the ultra-Orthodox have yet to be approved. Reservists are being called up for impossibly long stints to make up the shortfall. Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir reportedly warned cabinet ministers last month that the “IDF is going to collapse in on itself” amid a manpower shortage amounting to around 15,000 troops. In the area of hardware, the IDF’s stockpiles and the extent of wear-and-tear on equipment are closely guarded secrets, but hints of problems periodically surface, particularly in the supply of interceptors.

The economy: Over the last 20 years, the Israeli economy has shown a remarkable resilience in the face of frequent wars. The latest wars were no different: GDP contracted in the months after Hamas’s 2023 attack and during the 12-day war with Iran last June, and it almost certainly shrank again in the current war. But in each case, activity recovered quickly, and the economy continued to grow even as the war boosted Israel’s defense burden to among the highest in the world.

Part of this resilience is because Israeli businesses and workers have grown inured to war and have developed coping mechanisms. But no less important is the fact that the government has kept its finances in good shape, running relatively modest fiscal deficits and reducing its debt (as a share of GDP). The country’s high-tech sector and its natural gas production have enabled it to draw billions of dollars in foreign investment and to enjoy persistent surpluses in its current account. Generous U.S. aid, amounting to some $22 billion since the war in Gaza erupted, has eased the economic burden, as well. Israel could pay for wars.

But Netanyahu’s policies are testing this resilience. To cover the immense cost of all this fighting, the Israeli government has generally chosen to avoid increasing taxes or slashing civilian spending. That has helped keep the economy growing, but it has also meant that Israel’s public debt has jumped from a comparatively low 60 percent of GDP before the war in Gaza to a projected 70.5 percent at the end of 2026. This level of debt is far from dangerously high, but Netanyahu isn’t done lavishing money on the military. He is planning to add $116 billion to the defense budget over the next decade, which would amount to a steep 6 percent of GDP being devoted to defense. That level of spending will weigh on the economy through growing debt and/or higher taxes and lower civilian spending.

The United States: Hamas’s 2023 attack brought Israel unprecedented amounts of U.S. military, financial, and diplomatic support. The joint assault on Iran seemingly carried that backing to a new level. But all this may, in fact, constitute the high-water mark for U.S.-Israeli relations.

The Iran war has damaged Trump politically in the critical months leading up to the midterm elections in November. There is no sign that the president has turned on Netanyahu, but the prime minister and Israel are vulnerable to being set up as scapegoats for a failed war. A New York Times report detailing how Netanyahu sold Trump on the war and regime change, despite the doubts expressed by top Trump administration figures, may mark the beginning of such a campaign. If so, Israel’s ability to influence policy in Washington is likely to be undermined, certainly in pursuance of war-focused policies.

Trump will be out of office in 2029, but Israel’s problems in the United States run much deeper than a vengeful president. The carnage of the war in Gaza has caused Israel’s standing in American public opinion to decline sharply, and the Iran war is shaping up to make things worse. A March poll taken by the Pew Research Center found that 60 percent of Americans have a very or somewhat unfavorable view of Israel, compared to 42 percent since 2022. The problem is deepest among Democrats, but trends are running against Israel among Republicans, too, where 57 percent of party supporters ages 18 to 49 view Israel negatively. Many leading MAGA figures are claiming that Netanyahu fast-talked Trump into an attack that mainly served Israeli interests. The war’s opponents in the MAGA sphere are probably still a minority, but they are a loud and influential one that may very well gain traction if the economic and political fallout from the war grows.

Even as all three components of Israeli power look increasingly fragile, Netanyahu is acting like it’s business as usual. Does he have an alternative?

Critics say that Netanyahu should be leveraging Israel’s military achievements to reach diplomatic arrangements. But Netanyahu has shown that he has little faith in agreements where national security is involved. To a degree, his view is justified. The governments of Lebanon and Syria are too weak to deliver on commitments; Iran and Hamas are ideologically opposed to Israel’s very existence and thus not open to negotiating substantive agreements.

The catch is that Israel’s overwhelming military superiority over its enemies hasn’t been able to bring them to heel. Even Hamas has refused to back down, despite losing virtually all its military capabilities and prewar leadership, as well as control over half of the Gaza Strip. Thus, Israel seems destined to an uncertain future of forever wars amid diminishing resources and without the full backing of its American patron.