As far as most of the world is concerned, the Republic of Somaliland doesn’t exist. That’s inconvenient, because this nonexistent country now sits right next to one of the world’s most high-profile conflict zones, with massive repercussions for the global economy.

Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, commonly known by the nickname Irro, was in Washington in mid-September before heading to New York this week to make the case for the United States to recognize—or at least more formally engage with—the de facto state that, as far as official U.S. policy is concerned, is a breakaway province in northern Somalia.

Somaliland has been making this case for decades. Formerly the colony of British Somaliland, the country was officially independent for less than a week in 1960 before merging with formerly Italian-ruled Somalia. After a war of independence sparked by dictator Siad Barre’s sectarian rule, which saw the devastating bombing of the capital city of Hargeisa, Somaliland redeclared its independence in 1991 but was not recognized by any other country.

Today, Somaliland is a de facto state with its own government, currency, and security forces. It’s also mostly (though not completely) stable and democratic, in stark contrast with Somalia, but it has little ability to negotiate with foreign governments and is cut off from global financial markets. Though there’s little threat of Somalia reconquering Somaliland at this point, the border remains unstable.

It’s only been in the past few years that Somaliland’s quest to be recognized by the world has started to pick up some steam, thanks in large part to the country’s location.

In 2016, Dubai-based company DP World agreed to develop a major regional port in Somaliland’s coastal city of Berbera. In 2020, Somaliland and fellow de facto state Taiwan agreed to establish representative offices in each other’s territories. In 2024, Somaliland signed a deal with Ethiopia to lease part of the country’s coastline to its landlocked neighbor, which prompted immediate regional backlash and, to Hargeisa’s disappointment, did not lead to Addis Ababa’s formal recognition of Somaliland’s independence.

But the biggest and most surprising development came last December, when Israel, seeing an opportunity for an ally on the opposite end of the Red Sea, just across from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland. Irro was formally received by Israeli President Isaac Herzog on a visit to Jerusalem in June—a first by any foreign government in Somaliland’s 35 years of de facto independence.

Irro is hoping that the United States could be next, and his country’s increasingly critical strategic location, just south of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, now under a stranglehold by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels, is helping him make his case. Somaliland’s case for U.S. recognition has shifted over time. Hargeisa has long touted its democratic bona fides. After forming its relationship with Taiwan, it presented itself as a pro-Western bastion that could help combat Chinese influence in the region; now, thanks to the Houthis, maritime security has become a major part of the narrative.

“We have been preaching for a long time that this area is very important to the world, to trade, to maritime security,” the 70-year-old president, elected in 2024, told me during his visit to Washington. “For a long time, we’ve been offering a partnership on marine security. Unfortunately, when it comes to the Red Sea, countries ignore Somaliland, which I consider a very serious mistake. Now, the area has reached a boiling point.”

Irro has been meeting members of Congress as well as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Frank Garcia. His pitch is that Somaliland could be an all-American bastion on the Red Sea, one with demonstrated past success at combating the extremist groups and coastal pirates that have plagued Somalia.

“Somaliland offers Washington a stable, democratic hub with no competing foreign military presence and no ambiguity about whose side we are on,” he said in a speech at the Hudson Institute on Sept. 14. The remark is a pointed reference to neighboring Djibouti, the only country in the world to host both Chinese and U.S. military bases.

Then-U.S. Africa Command Commander Gen. Michael Langley paid a visit to Hargeisa last year, and Irro has said that his country is potentially open to hosting either U.S. or Israeli troops on its soil, though there are no concrete plans for such deployments right now.

Somaliland has spent years cultivating support in the U.S. Congress, particularly among Republicans, with some success. Texas Sen. Ted Cruz is an outspoken supporter. On Wednesday, Tennessee Rep. John Rose, a co-sponsor of a bill called the Somaliland Economic Access and Opportunity Act, pressed Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during testimony on allowing Somaliland access to the SWIFT financial messaging system.

Irro also held a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump’s son Eric in Davos, Switzerland, in January and speaks glowingly of the president. “President Trump is a great leader, and he’s trying to make peace,” he said. “Hopefully, our message directly reaches the president, and we hope he will respond positively.”

The Trump administration would appear to present a unique opportunity for Somaliland independence. Opponents of recognizing Somaliland, most prominently the African Union, argue that it would set a dangerous precedent that would embolden separatist movements across the continent. But no modern president has cared less about preserving the geographical status quo than Trump, who has torn up precedent by recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, not to mention his designs on Greenland and recent comments on Ireland.

Unfortunately for Somaliland, its push for recognition conflicts with another of the Trump administration’s top priorities: the little-discussed ongoing drone war against Islamist militants in Somalia, which—until the war in Iran started—was arguably this president’s most extensive military operation. That operation, championed in the administration by National Security Council (NSC) Director for Counterterrorism Sebastian Gorka, relies on the support and assistance of the government in Mogadishu.

Irro told me that he was optimistic that the administration is “reviewing its policy toward Somalia.”

“It would be unfortunate if this opportunity is lost,” said Tibor Nagy, who served as assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the first Trump administration. “You and I both know that President Trump could care less what the African Union thinks. Maybe, if he gets angry enough at Somalia for domestic political reasons, he’ll pull the plug and recognize Somaliland, but the counterterrorism priorities of the NSC present a block.”

When asked if any change in policy toward Hargeisa was under consideration, a State Department spokesperson told me by email, “The United States recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, which includes the territory of Somaliland. Within that framework, we engage with Somaliland authorities on issues of mutual interest.”

Irro describes Somalia and Israel as “two democracies on opposite ends of the Red Sea” with common interests. I asked him if he was concerned about the backlash from the wider Muslim world about associating with Israel at this particular moment. Israel’s move to recognize Somaliland last year was condemned by both the African Union and the Arab League, of which Somalia is a member.

Irro said that in May 2025, he sent a petition to governments around the world, including Arab states, asking for recognition, and that Israel was the only one that responded positively. “Hopefully, the others will follow,” he said. He compared the backlash to the Arab League’s temporary expulsion of Egypt following Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel in 1978. “They all came back,” he said.

Around the time of the Israeli recognition, there were news reports that Israel and the United States were eyeing Somaliland as a location to resettle expelled civilians from Gaza. Irro called those reports “totally baseless” and said that it had not been a topic of discussion. However, he has suggested that Somaliland would be willing to contribute troops to the still-theoretical international “stabilization force” for Gaza envisioned in Trump’s peace plan for the enclave.

As for its relationship with Taiwan, Somaliland has benefited from Taiwanese investment, including health clinics and the first-ever government data center in Hargeisa. But the connection has also antagonized Beijing, which has staunchly opposed international recognition of Somaliland. Irro said that “some big countries, maybe China, maybe Turkey, maybe Egypt … are campaigning against the recognition of Somaliland.”

On Sept. 16, the Chinese Embassy in Somalia condemned Irro’s pro-Taiwan remarks in Washington for having “blatantly violated the one-China principle and seriously infringed upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Taiwan—which despite its ambiguous status has become one of the wealthiest places in the world, is a lynchpin of global trade, and has a real if sometimes awkward security relationship with the United States—may be the gold standard for what unrecognized countries can achieve. It would be a stretch to call Somaliland an “African Taiwan,” but Hargeisa’s pitch for itself—a democratic U.S. ally in the middle of a global hot spot—is similar, and the ongoing “strategic ambiguity” surrounding Taiwan suggests that there may be a middle path between Somaliland’s current limbo and full recognition.

“We would welcome at least getting a different status than Somalia from the United States, especially status like Taiwan,” Irro said. “They can deal the same way with Somaliland.”

Omar Mahmood, a Horn of Africa analyst at the International Crisis Group, said that while Somaliland’s recognition quest has been picking up momentum of late, there were local expectations that Israel’s move would lead to more countries following suit, which has not yet come to pass. Mahmood is skeptical that unilateral international declarations can resolve Somalia’s crisis.

“Somaliland can get 50 more countries to recognize, but if there is this fault line between them and Somalia, you’re always going to have kind of a militarized border. You’re always going to have a risk that it could spark into new conflict,” he said.

Noting that apart from rare talks, there’s been all-too-little negotiation between Somalia and Somaliland themselves in recent years, Mahmood added, “rather than looking outside the region for the solution, the solution has to come within.”

The 21st century has not been kind to the creation of new countries, with only a small handful of new independent states—Montenegro, Serbia, South Sudan, and East Timor—and even widely recognized governments such as those of Palestine and Kosovo languishing without full U.N. membership. It’s far from clear that even the leverage that Somaliland has gained from the crisis in the Red Sea, its recent momentum with Israel and Taiwan, and an unpredictable U.S. president will be enough to overcome the inertia and fear of chaos and dangerous precedents that work against new independence movements.

But Irro, who served as Somalia’s ambassador in Moscow during the breakup of the Soviet Union and had a front-row seat as one country suddenly became 15, takes a long view.

“We’ve learned a lot over the last 35 years,” he said. “We are survivors.”