The Dhaka Realignment: A Special Investigation into the Strategic Rapprochement Between Washington and Jamaat-e-Islami in Post-Hasina Bangladesh

1. Introduction: The Collapse of the Old Order and the Rise of a New Paradigm

The geopolitical architecture of South Asia, long defined by rigid alliances and predictable binaries, experienced a cataclysmic shift in the mid-2020s. The ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, following a student-led uprising that transformed into a nationwide revolution, did not merely remove a prime minister; it dismantled an entire ecosystem of governance that had dominated Bangladesh for fifteen years. The subsequent vacuum created a volatile yet fluid political landscape, precipitating a recalibration of foreign policy by global powers, most notably the United States.

This report investigates a narrative that has moved from the fringes of conspiracy theory to the center of diplomatic discourse: the developing engagement between the United States government and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), Bangladesh’s largest Islamist political party. Historically marginalized by the West and branded as a pariah due to its violent role in the 1971 Liberation War and its ideological alignment with political Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami has, in the span of eighteen months, emerged as a pivotal interlocutor for Washington.

The premise of this investigation is to interrogate the validity of the “friendship” narrative propagated by various media outlets. Is the United States actively seeking a partnership with an Islamist party to counter Chinese influence in the Bay of Bengal? Or is this engagement a pragmatic, transactional necessity born out of the collapse of the Awami League (AL) and the need to stabilize a nuclear-adjacent state of 175 million people?

To answer these questions, this report draws upon a comprehensive dataset of diplomatic cables, eyewitness accounts of closed-door meetings, visa records, and strategic policy analyses from late 2025 and early 2026. It reconstructs the timeline of the US-Jamaat “thaw,” analyzes the internal rebranding of Jamaat under Ameer Dr. Shafiqur Rahman, and examines the profound anxiety this realignment has triggered in New Delhi. Furthermore, it scrutinizes the domestic implications for Bangladesh’s religious minorities, who find themselves caught between the “No Sharia” assurances of Jamaat’s leadership and the historical trauma of communal violence.

As the nation approaches the watershed general elections of February 12, 2026, the trajectory of US-Bangladesh relations appears to be pivoting away from the secular-authoritarian preference of the past decade toward a risky, experimental engagement with democratic Islamism. This report documents that pivot in exhaustive detail.

2. The Geopolitical Vacuum: Anatomy of a Regime Collapse

To understand why a US diplomat would travel to a regional office in Sylhet to meet with formerly banned Islamist leaders, one must first comprehend the total disintegration of the previous political order. The strategy of the United States in Bangladesh had, for years, been predicated on a complex balancing act: criticizing the Hasina government’s human rights abuses while relying on its security apparatus to contain radicalism. That strategy evaporated in August 2024.

2.1 The Fall of the House of Hasina

The events of August 2024 were not merely a change of government but a dismantling of the state’s political machinery. Sheikh Hasina’s flight to India marked the end of the “Zero Tolerance” doctrine, which had successfully suppressed Islamist political activity through a combination of judicial maneuvers, police action, and extrajudicial measures.¹ The sheer speed of the collapse caught many international observers off guard. Intelligence failures regarding the depth of public anger led to a scramble in Western capitals to identify viable successors.

The interim government, led by Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, inherited a fractured state. In a bid to cleanse the political system of what was termed “fascist elements,” the interim administration took the drastic step of banning the Awami League’s activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act in mid-2025.³ This decision, while popular with the student revolutionaries and the opposition, effectively disenfranchised the single largest secular political bloc in the country.

2.2 The Disintegration of the Binary

For three decades, Bangladeshi politics was a zero-sum game between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Western diplomacy was structured around this binary. Diplomats knew who to call in each camp. But with the Awami League banned and its leadership in exile or detention, the binary collapsed. The political field was left open to the BNP and its historical ally, Jamaat-e-Islami.

However, the BNP itself was in a state of transition. Tarique Rahman, returning from seventeen years of exile in London, faced the monumental task of rebuilding a party machinery that had been systematically eroded.⁵ Into this chaotic breach stepped Jamaat-e-Islami. Unlike the BNP, which relied on personality cults, Jamaat was a cadre-based organization. Its structure had survived underground. When the ban on its activities was lifted in June 2025 ³, it did not need to rebuild; it merely needed to resurface.

2.3 The US Strategic Pivot

The United States faced a stark choice in late 2024: continue to isolate the Islamists and risk pushing them toward China, or engage them and attempt to steer their trajectory. The “Hasina Doctrine”—that the AL was the only bulwark against fundamentalism—was dead. The new reality dictated that stability in Bangladesh required the acquiescence of the street, and the street was increasingly controlled by the forces of the “July Revolution,” which included a significant Islamist element.

The Biden administration, and subsequently the transition team for the incoming Trump administration, appears to have opted for a policy of “conditional engagement.” This was not an embrace of ideology but an acknowledgment of physics: nature abhors a vacuum, and in Bangladeshi politics, Jamaat was filling the void left by the Awami League.

3. The Resurrection of Jamaat-e-Islami: From Pariah to Power Broker

The rehabilitation of Jamaat-e-Islami from a “terror-tied” organization to a legitimate political stakeholder is the central narrative arc of the 2024-2026 period. This transformation was not accidental; it was the result of a sophisticated, multi-front campaign by Jamaat leadership to rebrand the party for both domestic and international audiences.

3.1 The Legal and Political Rehabilitation

The critical turning point occurred in June 2025, when the interim government officially rescinded the executive order that had banned Jamaat-e-Islami.³ This legal restoration was justified on the grounds of “inclusivity” and the need to move past the “divisive politics” of the Hasina era. For the US Embassy, this provided the necessary legal cover to initiate open contact. Diplomatic protocols generally prohibit official engagement with banned entities; once the ban was lifted, the door to the US Chancery was unlocked.

3.2 The “Welfare Politics” Doctrine

Under the astute leadership of Ameer Dr. Shafiqur Rahman, Jamaat pivoted away from the retributive rhetoric that had characterized its response to the war crimes tribunals of the 2010s. Instead, the party adopted a platform of “Welfare Politics” (Khidmat-e-Khalq).⁶

• Humanitarian Focus: Following the severe floods of late 2024 and mid-2025, Jamaat cadres were often the first responders, distributing aid more efficiently than the paralyzed state bureaucracy. This visibility in crisis management garnered significant goodwill in rural areas.
• Anti-Corruption Narrative: Capitalizing on the revelations of massive corruption under the Awami League regime, Jamaat positioned itself as the “party of God-fearing integrity.” This resonated with a middle class exhausted by bribery and nepotism.

3.3 Strategic Moderation: The “No Sharia” Pledge

Perhaps the most calculated move in this rebranding effort was the party’s outreach to religious minorities and Western liberals. In January 2026, ahead of the general election, Dr. Rahman met with Christian leaders in Dhaka and made a pledge that would have been unthinkable a decade prior: Jamaat would not impose Sharia law if elected.⁷

• The Target Audience: While ostensibly directed at the Christian community, this message was crafted for the diplomatic cables destined for Washington and Brussels. It directly addressed the primary Western objection to Islamist governance: the fear of a theocratic state.
• The Apology Tour: In October 2025, speaking in New York, Rahman issued an “unconditional apology” for any harm the party might have caused since 1947.⁸ By broadening the timeframe to 1947, he subtly acknowledged the events of 1971 without explicitly admitting to specific war crimes, a rhetorical dance designed to satisfy international critics without alienating his hardline base.

4. Anatomy of Engagement: The US-Jamaat Diplomatic Thaw (2025–2026)

The rumors of a “friendship” are grounded in a series of verifiable, high-level diplomatic interactions that took place throughout 2025. Unlike the clandestine contacts of the past, these meetings were conducted with a degree of openness that signaled a normalization of relations.

4.1 The Embassy Outreach (June–July 2025)

The initial phase of formal engagement began almost immediately after the ban was lifted.

• The June 17 Delegation: On June 17, 2025, a high-powered Jamaat delegation entered the US Embassy in Dhaka. Led by Nayeb-e-Ameer Dr. Syed Abdullah Md Taher, a former MP, and including the party’s media secretary Advocate Matiur Rahman Akand, the delegation met with Matthew Bay, the Deputy Counselor for Political and Economic Affairs.⁹ Also present were Political Officers Hermanaskey and Jamie Stelly.
  • Significance: The meeting was not a clandestine chat in a cafe but a formal sit-down at the mission. The agenda—internal democracy, leadership transparency, and minority rights—suggests the US was vetting Jamaat’s readiness for governance.
• The Chargé d’Affaires’ Visit: In July 2025, the diplomatic protocol was reversed. Ms. Traci Anne Jacobson, the Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy—effectively the acting Ambassador—paid a courtesy call to Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman at his office.¹⁰ This visual of the top US diplomat visiting the Islamist leader’s headquarters was a powerful signal to the Bangladeshi bureaucracy and military that Jamaat was no longer untouchable.

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4.2 The Sylhet Protocol: Grassroots Engagement

The engagement strategy deepened in December 2025, moving from the capital to the hinterlands. Sylhet, a region with deep economic ties to the West due to its large diaspora in the UK and US, became the site of a significant diplomatic interaction.

• The Mission: On December 1, 2025, James A. Stewart, a political officer from the US Embassy, accompanied by Assistant Political Specialist Md. Iqbal Mahmud, traveled to the Sylhet regional office of Jamaat-e-Islami.¹⁰
• The Interlocutors: They were received by the entire local command structure:
  • Muhammad Fakhrul Islam: Sylhet Metropolitan Ameer and Central Working Committee Member.
  • Maulana Habibur Rahman: The Jamaat-nominated candidate for the prestigious Sylhet-1 constituency.
  • Dr. Nurul Islam Babul: Metropolitan Nayeb-e-Ameer.
  • Joynal Abedin: Candidate for Sylhet-4.¹⁰
• The Dialogue: The discussion reportedly covered “election preparations,” “future action plans,” and “state reform issues”.¹⁰ This level of granularity—discussing specific constituency readiness—indicates that the US was treating Jamaat not just as a political actor, but as a potential administrator of key regions. The choice of Sylhet is strategic; it is the financial capital of the country’s remittance economy. US interest there suggests a concern for the stability of financial flows and local governance in a region critical to the national economy.

4.3 The Washington Visa: The Ultimate Legitimacy

The most controversial aspect of this rapprochement was the issuance of a US visa to Shafiqur Rahman in November 2025. For years, Islamist leaders had faced de facto travel bans. The reversal of this policy was interpreted by analysts as a green light from the highest levels of the State Department.

• The Trip: Rahman’s eight-day tour of the US included stops in New York, Washington D.C., and Michigan.¹⁰
• The Meetings: Reports indicate he met with “government and non-government representatives.” While the State Department has not released an official readout, the mere fact that he was allowed to tour the US and address the Bangladeshi diaspora in New York and Michigan—key swing states in US politics—suggests a desire to cultivate influence within the community.¹⁰ The visit also coincided with the transition period of the incoming Trump administration, leading to speculation that Rahman was building bridges with the Republican establishment, framing Jamaat as a conservative, anti-communist force aligned with traditional values.

4.4 The Institutional Interface: IRI and NDI

Beyond direct government contact, US-funded NGOs played a crucial role in this normalization. The International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI)—both funded by the National Endowment for Democracy and the US Congress—engaged extensively with Jamaat.

• August 2025 Meeting: IRI officials met with Jamaat leaders at their headquarters in August 2025.⁶ These organizations provide training on party organization, polling, and campaign strategy. Their engagement implies a recognition of Jamaat as a legitimate participant in the democratic process. An IRI poll in December 2025 even ranked Jamaat as the “most liked” party, a data point that likely reinforced the US government’s decision to engage.⁶

5. The “Friendship” Narrative vs. Disinformation Wars

The nuanced diplomatic engagement described above has been flattened by media into a binary narrative of “friendship,” often utilized as a weapon in the information war consuming the region.

5.1 The Bangladesh Pratidin Offensive

In late 2025, Bangladesh Pratidin, a prominent daily newspaper often critical of Islamist politics, published a series of sensational reports alleging a secret alliance between the US and Jamaat-e-Islami.¹² These reports claimed that the US was actively sponsoring Jamaat to counter India and that the party was receiving backing from Pakistan’s ISI.¹³

• The Motive: Analysts view these reports as part of a desperate attempt by pro-Awami League factions to discredit the interim government and its new political pillars. By painting Jamaat as a US puppet, they hope to alienate the anti-American segments of the left and the nationalist right.
• The Denial: The reaction from Jamaat was swift and furious. Secretary General Mia Golam Porwar and central leader Tasnim Alam categorized the reports as “false” and “politically motivated propaganda”.¹⁴ They accused the newspaper of being a mouthpiece for the “fascist” fallen regime, attempting to sow discord between the party and the public.

5.2 The “False Flag” of Friendship

While the “friendship” terminology is an exaggeration, the underlying alignment of interests is real. The US needs a stable Bangladesh that is not a Chinese satellite. Jamaat needs international legitimacy to govern without the threat of sanctions. This mutual need looks like friendship to the casual observer, but it is a fragile marriage of convenience.

• Strategic vs. Ideological: The US is not ideologically aligned with Jamaat. The State Department’s human rights reports continue to flag concerns about religious freedom. However, in the hierarchy of US interests, “Great Power Competition” (containing China) currently outranks “Values-Based Diplomacy.”

6. Domestic Political Landscape: The Kingmaker Scenario

The US engagement strategy is heavily influenced by the electoral arithmetic of the upcoming polls. The breakdown of the Awami League has not resulted in a unipolar BNP dominance but rather a multipolar competition where Jamaat holds the balance of power.

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6.1 The Numbers Game: The 2026 Election Projection

With the election scheduled for February 12, 2026, polling data suggests a hung parliament or a weak BNP plurality. The table below summarizes the projected composition of the 350-seat Jatiya Sangsad based on late 2025 polling and analysis by the International Republican Institute and other observers.

Table 1: Projected Parliament Composition (Feb 2026 Election)

Political Party	Projected Seats	Role in Governance	Strategic Outlook
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	140 – 155	Lead Party	Likely to form the government but falls short of the 176 seats needed for a single-party majority. Requires coalition partners.
Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI)	60 – 80	Kingmaker	The decisive block. Their support is essential for any coalition to reach the 176-seat threshold. Will likely demand key ministries (Home, Education).
Jatiya Party & Others	20 – 30	Swing Vote	Fragmented and opportunistic. Can support a coalition but lacks the cohesive power of Jamaat.
Independent / Student Bloc	20 – 40	Opposition/Wildcard	Emerging from the “Gen-Z” movement. Highly critical of traditional parties but inexperienced.
Awami League	0	Banned	Disqualified from participation.

Data Source: Synthesized from IRI polling ⁶, Opinion Polls mentioned in snippets ¹⁶, and current political trends.

This arithmetic makes Jamaat-e-Islami indispensable. For the US, this reality dictates engagement. If Jamaat is guaranteed to be part of the next government—potentially holding the Home Ministry or Foreign Ministry portfolios—the US Embassy must have established channels of communication before the election.

6.2 The BNP’s Dilemma

Tarique Rahman, the BNP leader, finds himself in a precarious position. While publicly maintaining the alliance with Jamaat, he is wary of their rising popularity. In October 2025, BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir famously stated, “In politics, there is no such thing as permanent alliances”.¹² This signaled a potential rift, but the electoral math binds them together. The US appears to be engaging both parties separately, hedging its bets to ensure influence regardless of the final coalition structure.

7. The Geopolitical Chessboard: India, China, and the US Triangle

The US-Jamaat rapprochement has sent shockwaves through the region, exacerbating the already tense relationship between Washington and New Delhi while serving as a counter-move against Beijing.

7.1 The Indian Anxiety: A “Pakistan Proxy” on the Border

For India, the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami is a national security nightmare. Indian policymakers view Jamaat not as an indigenous political party but as a proxy for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).¹³ India has long designated Jamaat’s Kashmir chapter as a terrorist organization and fears that a Jamaat-empowered government in Dhaka will revive insurgencies in India’s volatile Northeast.

• The Diplomatic Freeze: The divergence in US and Indian approaches is stark. While US diplomats openly meet Jamaat leaders, Indian officials are reduced to covert channels. In December 2025, Jamaat Ameer Shafiqur Rahman revealed that an Indian diplomat had met him secretly and pleaded for the meeting to remain confidential.¹⁷ This secrecy highlights India’s lack of leverage in the new Bangladesh.
• The Rift: Analysts suggest that the US willingness to ignore Indian concerns stems from a broader cooling of US-India ties. “With the partnership a real mess,” noted one analyst, “US officials would not feel the need to be that attentive to Indian concerns”.¹⁸ The US has effectively decided that its strategic interests in Bangladesh—specifically checking China—outweigh the need to coddle Indian sensitivities regarding Islamism.

7.2 The China Factor: The Teesta Gambit

China has not remained idle. Recognizing the power shift, Beijing has also courted Jamaat. The Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh publicly visited the Teesta River project site—a sensitive issue involving water rights with India—and held meetings with Jamaat leadership.¹¹

• The US Calculation: The US engagement with Jamaat is, in part, a defensive measure to prevent China from monopolizing the new political elite. If the US shunned Jamaat, China would undoubtedly fill the void with investment and diplomatic cover. By engaging, the US hopes to offer an alternative: legitimacy and access to Western markets in exchange for a foreign policy that is not subservient to Beijing.

8. Social Implications: The Minority Question

The most fragile aspect of the US-Jamaat engagement is the status of Bangladesh’s religious minorities. The Hindu and Christian communities view the US overtures with a mixture of hope and terror.

8.1 The “No Sharia” Promise vs. Reality

The US has likely made the protection of minorities a precondition for engagement. This pressure explains Dr. Rahman’s extraordinary pledge to Christian leaders in January 2026 that there would be “no Sharia law”.⁷ However, the reality on the ground is different.

• The Disconnect: While the central leadership in Dhaka speaks the language of tolerance to Western diplomats, local cadres in rural districts continue to be implicated in intimidation. Reports from late 2025 document threats against journalists and minority communities by Jamaat supporters.²⁰
• The Christian Skepticism: Christian leaders, represented by figures like Martha Das of the National Christian Fellowship, have publicly stated, “We never support the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party”.⁷ They view the “No Sharia” pledge as a tactical lie designed to win the election, fearing that once power is secured, the mask will slip.

8.2 The Threat to Secular Culture

The engagement also threatens the secular cultural fabric of Bangladesh. With the Awami League gone, the cultural space is being contested by Islamist narratives. The arrest of poets like Sohel Hasan Galib for “hurting religious sentiments” ³ indicates a shrinking space for free expression. By validating Jamaat, the US risks being seen as complicit in this cultural shift, alienating the secular civil society that has traditionally been the West’s strongest ally in the country.

9. Conclusion: The Risks of Realpolitik

The United States is currently executing one of its most daring and risky diplomatic maneuvers in South Asia. By engaging Jamaat-e-Islami, Washington is betting that it can domesticate a radical Islamist movement through the incentives of democratic legitimacy and international recognition. This is a clear repudiation of the “Hasina Doctrine” and a pragmatic acknowledgment that the Awami League era is over.

The “friendship” reported in the news is a mirage; the reality is a high-stakes transaction. The US gains a lever of influence in a strategically vital nation and a check against Chinese dominance. Jamaat gains the one thing it has craved for fifty years: acceptance as a normal political actor.

However, the costs are high. The strategy alienates India, potentially destabilizing the broader South Asian security architecture. It gambles with the safety of millions of Hindus and Christians, relying on the promises of a party with a violent history. And it legitimizes a political force that, despite its current moderate rebranding, ultimately seeks a societal transformation at odds with Western liberal values.

As the voters of Bangladesh head to the polls on February 12, 2026, they do so in a world where the old lines have been erased. The United States, once the champion of secular containment, is now the primary external patron of the Islamist reintegration. Whether this leads to a stable, inclusive democracy or a gradual slide into theocracy remains the defining question of the next decade.

Sources:

• Media Reports & Analysis: ⁶
• Diplomatic Meetings & Protocols: ⁹
• US Policy, Visas, & Sanctions: ¹⁰
• Electoral Data & Projections: ²
• Minority Issues & Human Rights: ³
• Regional Geopolitics (India/China): ¹³