President Donald Trump appears to have responded to the dramatic midterm results by doubling down on MAGA. Among his first major acts after the blue wave was replacing his trusted chief of staff, Susie Wiles, with Stephen Miller. Few moves could have signaled more clearly that Trump the fighter was not going to give way to Trump the conciliator. Because the White House chief of staff is often considered the second most powerful position in Washington, the choice carries particular weight. Miller has been seen as one of the most influential voices in Trump 2.0, if not the most influential. He has been the driving force behind an extraordinarily expansive view of presidential power: targeting what the administration considers opposition institutions such as law firms, the media, and universities; launching a sweeping detention and deportation program; imposing a tariff program that rocked the national economy; and making aggressive moves in Latin America that have included striking boats allegedly transporting illegal narcotics.
While Trump will still need to be more cooperative and responsive toward the Democratic Congress, and in some cases will have no choice, Miller’s elevation will certainly push back against what should be the natural rhythm of presidential politics: When the president’s party suffers a whopping midterm defeat, and that president is a lame duck struggling with major domestic and international challenges, he moves toward the center.
But that’s not how Miller thinks, nor has it been Trump’s instinct. The Miller appointment stands in sharp contrast to the personnel change that then-President Ronald Reagan, the founding father of the conservative movement, made after the 1986 midterms and the scandal that broke out soon after. That year, Democrats regained control of the Senate (they had held the House since 1955), and the administration was embroiled in a major scandal that some Democrats believed could reach Watergate-like levels.
The contrast between these two presidents reveals just how far Republican politics has radicalized since the 1980s. It is also a warning sign for Republicans who understand that, without a major course correction, the very same party that was celebrating a new governing coalition in 2024 might be on a self-destructive path. The GOP is in the grip of a strong leader who is not particularly interested in the long-term health of the party that brought him to the White House.
Reagan was not enjoying a good political moment in November 1986, though his presidency had been riding high until then. His first term was highly successful, featuring a historic supply-side tax cut and a vast acceleration of defense spending. He had defeated his opponent, former Vice President Walter Mondale, in a landslide victory in 1984. His approval ratings had been strong, and the economy had recovered from the malaise of the 1970s. In October 1986, Reagan signed bipartisan tax reform legislation that closed loopholes benefiting some of the nation’s most powerful interests, and he held a historic summit with the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.
But then came the 1986 midterms. Democrats gained five seats in the House, expanding their majority to 258, and, more importantly, retook control of the Senate by gaining eight seats. Their 55-seat majority ended the brief period of Republican control that had started with the 1980 election. The outcome was seen as a rebuke of the harsher edges of U.S. conservatism, as well the heightened tension with the Soviet Union that a hawkish Reagan had helped spur, despite two summits with Gorbachev. Indeed, the summit just weeks before voting in Reykjavik, Iceland, had broken down because the president refused to give up on his plan to build a missile shield around the United States, the Strategic Defense Initiative (which opponents dismissed as “star wars”). Soon after the election, Reagan’s problems deepened as news spread that a Lebanese magazine had reported that the United States had been secretly selling weapons to Iran.
One of Reagan’s most significant moves in early 1987 was to replace his highly controversial chief of staff, Donald Regan. A former Marine and chairman of Merrill Lynch, Regan had been an important part of the Reagan administration since January 1981. As secretary of the Treasury, he had been instrumental in passing the 1981 tax cut. In February 1985, he became chief of staff, replacing James Baker (who replaced him at Treasury). Regan proved to be a forceful presence. He centralized control and pushed the president’s program in a highly aggressive and abrasive fashion that angered colleagues in the White House, as well as on Capitol Hill. The media did not find him very pleasant to work with, while first lady Nancy Reagan didn’t trust that he prioritized her husband’s interests.
With Regan by his side, Reagan’s first public response to what became the Iran-Contra scandal was defiance, which reflected his chief of staff’s approach to most issues. On Nov. 13, Reagan went on television to insist that there was nothing serious to investigate. While acknowledging that the White House had sold a small amount of “defensive” weapons to Iran as part of a major diplomatic initiative to build ties with moderates within the regime and combat terrorism, he denied that the United States had traded arms for hostages, or that the sales amounted to anything significant. Polls showed that the public was unconvinced that the president was telling the whole truth. Then, on Nov. 25, the other shoe dropped: Attorney General Edwin Meese announced that profits from the weapons sales had been diverted to the anti-communist Nicaraguan Contras, despite the Boland Amendments’ congressional ban on such aid.
Privately, administration officials feared where the investigations were headed. For a generation that had watched Richard Nixon resign over Watergate just 12 years earlier, the possibility of impeachment seemed real. Reagan’s aides also understood that many voters had been shaped by those same memories, and were deeply distrustful of government officials and still insistent on a political system that could hold them accountable.
On Feb. 26, 1987, the president’s Special Review Board, a commission appointed by Reagan in November and headed by former Texas Sen. John Tower, issued its report on the Iran scandal. It blamed a chaotic management system that had allowed the arms sales and the diversion of funds to proceed, faulting Reagan’s leadership style and singling out Regan for failing to impose order on the White House. The next day, Regan resigned after learning that he was about to be relieved of his duties.
At this fraught moment, the president turned to Howard Baker.
The 61-year-old, mild-mannered Republican had served in the Senate from 1967 to 1985, the last four years as majority leader, and was respected on both sides of the aisle. He had been mentored by Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (who was also his father-in-law), who taught him the ways and means of the legislative process and the art of bipartisan deal-making. Baker had gained national fame during the 1973 Watergate hearings by asking, “What did the president know and when did he know it?” Known as a moderate and an institutionalist, Baker was a selection widely seen as Reagan’s recognition that, with Democrats now controlling both chambers, he needed to build bridges to Capitol Hill rather than burn them. “I’d probably take some lumps from our right wingers but I can handle that,” Reagan noted in his diary, of appointing Baker.
Though Baker had actually been the third choice for chief of staff, he helped bring stability to the White House and guided the president through the Iran-Contra scandal. He brought in a first-rate team of advisors who improved relations with Congress, the press, and the first lady. Reagan biographers credit Baker with helping Reagan survive the scandal as the revelations mounted during the 1987 congressional hearings. He played a key role in brokering a budget deal with Congress after the October 1987 stock market crash and securing Senate ratification of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union in May 1988. His tenure also had setbacks, most notably the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court. But his pragmatic outlook helped Reagan recover from the low of the 1986 midterms. “You always leave yourself a backdoor, a side door, and a trapdoor,” he liked to say, quoting something his father used to tell him. According to a longtime aide, that meant: “You don’t talk in absolutes. You don’t want to get yourself boxed in where you can’t maneuver.”
Overall, Reagan and the first lady had reason to be pleased with Baker’s work: The president left office with high approval ratings—and helped bring an end to the Cold War.
Today’s Republican Party is not your grandfather’s Republican Party, and the recent midterms suggested that much of the electorate is not happy with it. The reach of the Democratic victories into deeply red parts of the country, including Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Kansas, suggests that the onetime party of Lincoln has a major problem on its hands. Part of that problem is the president himself, who after further radicalizing the GOP to its electoral detriment, shows few signs that he will change course in ways that could strengthen the party that brought him to the dance.
With Miller as chief of staff, Trump is assuring voters that there will be more of the same style of politics and the same political agenda—leaving the Democratic Party with the kind of political prospects for united government that seemed impossible just a few months ago.
