In New Delhi, officials and analysts alike awaited the results of the U.S. midterm elections on Nov. 3 with anticipation. U.S. President Donald Trump’s mercurial and idiosyncratic policies both at home and abroad—with few constraints on his choices—have rippled through global capitals since he returned to the White House last year.

India has suffered especially from recent U.S. policy vagaries, which have upturned a bilateral relationship that was by and large steadily improving and deepening. These include Trump’s tariff wars, apparent fondness for Pakistan’s leadership, and harsh approach to immigration. So, now that almost all the midterm results are in—and the Democratic Party will control both houses of Congress—how is India’s political class and attentive public reacting to the outcome?

At one level, the results have generated some hope for the future of bilateral ties. New Delhi’s guarded optimism stems from a belief that a Democratic Congress might place some checks on the Trump administration’s propensity to make feckless decisions with adverse consequences for New Delhi. After all, the U.S.-India partnership enjoyed a bipartisan consensus for the last few decades, until Trump’s second term.

Despite this sense of relief, Indian observers still harbor some qualms toward the United States. They are aware that any U.S. president wields substantial power in conducting foreign policy. Trump has made considerable use of this authority with a pliant Republican Congress, from his legally dubious ouster of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to his unpopular and undeclared war in Iran. New Delhi will watch intently for early signs of the new Congress reining in his tendency to act with little hesitation or consultation.

A host of other issues remain on the minds of New Delhi’s foreign-policy establishment. Indian officials are aware that U.S. lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have concerns about India’s dependence on and willingness to purchase Russian oil. This poses a dilemma for New Delhi, which cannot easily dispense with these imports because of high costs and its refining facilities, which are tied to specific grades of crude oil.

If external pressures mount to dilute ties between New Delhi and Moscow, India’s pro-Russia lobby may feel more inclined to urge Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government to adopt a tougher stance toward Washington. A more consistent approach toward Russian oil sales from the U.S. Congress, without exemptions for otherwise friendly nations, might cause India to adopt a more intransigent stance.

Furthermore, many people in New Delhi—both within and outside the government—remain very concerned about the Trump administration’s dalliance with Islamabad since India and Pakistan’s military conflict last year. At the time of the crisis, which came in the wake of a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, Trump asserted that he had stepped in to induce a cease-fire between the two neighboring rivals. India, long averse to any external involvement in the Kashmir dispute, denies that Trump played a role in ending the conflict.

Pakistan, however, said the Trump administration was crucial in bringing about a cease-fire and nominated the U.S. president for the Nobel Peace Prize. Trump, in turn, invited Pakistani Army chief Asim Munir to lunch at the White House. The United States has since taken an interest in Pakistan’s mineral and cryptocurrency resources, and the country has offered the Trump administration several lucrative deals.

Indian observers will pay close attention to the relevant, newly constituted congressional committees to see if they evince any interest in looking closely at the U.S.-Pakistan strategic nexus. Among other matters, U.S. lawmakers may scrutinize the investments that Trump’s children have made in Pakistan, especially in cryptocurrency.

Many in New Delhi’s foreign-policy establishment will likely welcome some limits on Trump’s presidential powers. But with the victory of a few Democrats who care deeply about human rights issues both at home and abroad—such as civil liberties and minority rights—India may now confront a renewed focus on the state of its democracy under Modi. Trump, of course, has cared little about democratic backsliding and tended to give India a pass.

Historically, New Delhi’s stock responses to U.S. criticism of its human rights record and the state of its democracy have been twofold. First, that these matters fall under India’s purview, and external review impinges on its sovereignty. Second, that its own institutional mechanisms can provide suitable redress for any failures to uphold democratic principles. These retorts may not satisfy Democrats, who may not be inclined to sanction India but could pass non-binding resolutions that New Delhi might find irksome.

Other nettlesome bilateral issues—especially on trade and tariffs—may see some progress. In recent weeks, both the United States and India publicly suggested that a trade deal was nearing completion after protracted negotiations. On this front, officials in New Delhi feel somewhat sanguine; the trade accord does not depend on congressional approval. More to the point, if Trump is constrained in other arenas, he might want to score a foreign-policy victory.

Even with a finalized trade deal, the wariness that has crept into New Delhi’s view of Washington will not easily dissipate. To begin with, Trump’s fitful policies have undermined the trust so carefully nurtured by his predecessors. Restoring even a modicum of this trust will require some politically costly moves, such as offering concessions on trade or signaling a willingness to ease up on visa restrictions.

Despite the electoral rout of the Republicans, it remains an open question whether Trump will prove willing to adopt a more conciliatory approach to foreign policy.

Other differences between the United States and India on the global stage are likely to persist. Trump is reportedly weighing further major military action against Iran. Since the new Congress will not convene until January, the president may have an incentive to act soon. A renewed campaign in Iran would not be viewed favorably in New Delhi, as it would again disrupt vital oil supplies and place Indian sailors and expatriates in the Middle East at risk.

Modi’s government faces growing domestic dissent over allegations of electoral misconduct. These protests have shown few signs of abating and have energized India’s political opposition. Under the present circumstances, New Delhi cannot afford to remain silent if Trump embarks on another campaign in Iran with significant ramifications for India, including driving up the cost of fuel.

There is little question that last week’s Democratic victory amounts to a seismic shift in U.S. politics. Its effects on Trump’s foreign-policy choices, especially between now and January, remain unclear. New Delhi is likely to wait until the new Congress takes office before it tips its hand. But ultimately, from the Indian perspective, seriously repairing the relationship might be a task best deferred until after the 2028 U.S. presidential election.