Democrats Can’t Return to Pre-Trump Foreign Policy
The world has changed. A new approach must take that into account.

With Democrats in decisive control of the 120th Congress, the time has come for the party to offer a vision for what comes next for U.S. foreign policy. The country’s stunning repudiation of U.S. President Donald Trump is stoking the temptation to embrace a sharp policy reversal, on the assumption that the center of American democracy has held and the pre-Trump foreign-policy consensus can, too. However, when it comes to working with U.S. allies, that would be a grave mistake.
The next Congress has an important role to play in defining this new foreign-policy vision—one that the next president could build upon in 2029. In asserting its powers to conduct oversight, legislate, and conduct its own diplomacy, the Democratic majority should be seeking to put in place elements of a new U.S. approach, rather than simply reverse the Trumpian damage. Doing so will begin to reorient U.S. foreign policy in the next two years, shape foreign-policy debates in the coming presidential primary, and allow the next commander in chief to confront the world as it will be in 2029.
With Democrats in decisive control of the 120th Congress, the time has come for the party to offer a vision for what comes next for U.S. foreign policy. The country’s stunning repudiation of U.S. President Donald Trump is stoking the temptation to embrace a sharp policy reversal, on the assumption that the center of American democracy has held and the pre-Trump foreign-policy consensus can, too. However, when it comes to working with U.S. allies, that would be a grave mistake.
The next Congress has an important role to play in defining this new foreign-policy vision—one that the next president could build upon in 2029. In asserting its powers to conduct oversight, legislate, and conduct its own diplomacy, the Democratic majority should be seeking to put in place elements of a new U.S. approach, rather than simply reverse the Trumpian damage. Doing so will begin to reorient U.S. foreign policy in the next two years, shape foreign-policy debates in the coming presidential primary, and allow the next commander in chief to confront the world as it will be in 2029.
The impulse to reverse course on Trump’s alliance policy is understandable. The president has brought two years of vitriol and abuse upon the United States’ closest friends—from a trade war with Canada to threats to invade Greenland—with clear strategic costs. But the flaws of his approach, and its broad unpopularity with the American public, are not a mandate for reflexive reversal. Nevertheless, there is a growing view in both Washington and allied capitals that, under new congressional leadership and with a new administration just two years away, Washington should take a maximally conciliatory approach to its friends. Apology tours, day-one tariff repeals, and the reinstatement of withdrawn troops in allied countries are all cited as necessary steps to regain lost trust.
The problem with that approach is twofold. First, it prioritizes rebuilding trust with allies over something more important—transforming old alliance bargains. The U.S. alliance system was built for the early Cold War world and used conventional and nuclear deterrence to keep threats far from the country’s shores. Its record of success is remarkable: No U.S. ally has ever been attacked, and U.S. treaty guarantees were invoked just once—on Washington’s behalf following the Sept. 11 attacks. But in the post-Cold War world, the United States and its allies need to cooperate on artificial intelligence, securing vital supply chains, aligning on climate and industrial policy, and combatting threats in cyberspace. Reembracing alliances without insisting on much-needed modernization would miss the chance to update them for new opportunities and threats, leaving the U.S. alliance network far less effective.
Reflexive policy reversal also ignores the ways in which allies approach the United States differently after Trump’s reelection and punitive second term. U.S. leadership on global issues is now constrained by a four-year problem. Having seen the United States succumb to political chaos twice in a decade at the expense of its own global position, friends and partners around the world will assume that any future deal they cut with the United States is only good for four years, until power changes hands again. If the United States wants close cooperation from allies in this world, then it will have to give them some space to build autonomy and resilience in case Washington defects again.
Taking this advice would prompt Democratic leaders to resist conventional wisdom on two issues in particular: tariffs and defense burden-sharing.
Trump’s trade war has proven to be both bad policy and bad politics, and it has hit U.S. allies as hard as its competitors. Many allies will argue that tariff reversals are an essential precondition for earning back their trust in the post-Trump era. But pursuing a unilateral, blanket repeal of tariffs on allies and partners—whether as an act of Congress or in the early days of a new administration—would be a mistake. Instead, Democrats can use their newfound control of Congress to check illegal tariffs that have driven up costs for American consumers, such as tariffs on forced labor, and repeal senseless duties on Canada. Such steps should pave the way for a broader international-economic agenda in 2029 that strengthens the U.S. economy and restores predictability for workers and businesses. That could start with plans to lower remaining tariffs on allies as part of a new economic bargain that includes bold, joint action against unfair Chinese trade practices and new agreements on technology and supply chain cooperation. Trump’s wanton tariff leverage should be parlayed into new cooperation, rather than freely ceded, to serve the bottom line of the American people and those in friendly nations.
A phased plan for tariffs also points the way for Democrats to take a new approach to allied burden-sharing on security and defense. Denouncing Trump’s abusive approach, elevating alliances as a strategic priority, and unambiguously acknowledging China and Russia as shared threats can begin to improve U.S. relationships. But congressional Democrats should not launch an apology tour or provide slavish reassurances that undercut the progress that allies have made toward better defending themselves. Instead, Democrats should encourage allies to continue investing in their own defense in Europe and Asia, and adjust U.S. policies to actively support these efforts, even if the United States loses some influence as allies take on a greater role. Following a disastrous war with Iran that has cratered U.S. defense stockpiles, Congress should fund super-charged efforts to coproduce munitions and other critical systems alongside allies to rebuild deterrence. And, notwithstanding the flawed process by which the Trump administration has approached its ongoing global force posture review, Democrats should bring an open mind to the strategic benefits of a rebalanced U.S. presence in some regions.
Newly empowered, Democrats should seize the opportunity to reassert allies as central to U.S. global strategy. But that should not mean a return to old patterns of burden-sharing, which too often let allies off the hook and created dependencies that they will no longer accept and the United States should not encourage. Nor should Washington fall back on traditional modes of collaboration, which privileged military commitments whose benefits may feel abstract and undervalued the economic and technological domains that most benefit Americans. The Trump shock to the U.S. alliance system has come with high costs, and most of this approach should be rejected. But Democrats should also identify where policies of the past two years have created new openings or new leverage and use those opportunities wisely, rather than giving them away for free. Rebuilding critical U.S. relationships is essential, but it is a long-term project. After two Trump presidencies, quick policy concessions will not overcome the structural sources of allied skepticism about U.S. reliability.
The world that the next U.S. president meets in 2029 will look dramatically different than the one of 2025 or 2021. The post-Cold War era has ended in a convulsion, and the Trump presidency, which has intentionally ravaged the United States’ global role, has two years of chaos remaining. Rather than attempt to run down the clock through 2028 and overturn his disastrous policies wholesale, congressional Democrats have a chance to build a policy bridge to a new era. By prioritizing the renovation and resilience in the U.S. global alliance system, Congress can work with—rather than in reflexive opposition to—the epochal global shifts that have taken place and position Washington to inaugurate a new era of global leadership in 2029.
Rebecca Lissner is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy and director of the Future of American Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations. She served as a deputy assistant to the president and principal deputy national security advisor to the vice president in the Biden-Harris administration. X: @RebeccaLissner
Mira Rapp-Hooper is a partner at the Asia Group and a visiting senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. She was the senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House’s National Security Council from 2023-2025.
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