As the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran drags on, it’s possible to imagine both a negotiated settlement and a resumption of the fighting. The outcome—either war or peace—depends on how the three parties to the conflict see their goals, what risks they’re willing to take, and what limitations they face at home and abroad. In an earlier piece, I wrote about gaps in our knowledge of Iran today, which make it difficult to predict the country’s next moves. This article identifies similar gaps in our understanding of the U.S. and Israeli positions.

What do the United States and Israel consider “victory”?

Both U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a wide range of goals when war broke out. The two countries both oppose Iranian nuclear enrichment, seeing it as a way to build a nuclear bomb. They are also bent on eliminating Iran’s missile and drone threat, along with its naval forces, and in general seek to weaken the country’s military capabilities. Both oppose Iran’s regional proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, and have declared support for regime change in Iran. After Iran threatened maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, a new goal—freedom of navigation—was added to the list.

For almost all of these goals, success is subject to interpretation. More than half of Iran’s missile launchers have been destroyed or damaged, and its missile stockpile has been halved—is that enough, or must the missile threat from Iran be removed completely for this goal to be met? Regime change looks unlikely, and if anything, the war has left hard-liners even more entrenched. Can the United States truly win with a more conservative regime in place?

The many ambitious goals suggest that the deeper problem is a lack of clear priorities. Which of the above objectives are essential, in which case is total success is necessary; which are valuable, in which case partial success is acceptable; and which can be discarded? When negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, U.S. President Barack Obama prioritized Iran’s nuclear program. Opponents criticized the resulting deal for not addressing Iran’s missiles, support for proxies, and human rights record, among other concerns. Obama was willing to settle for partial success. Will Trump risk complete failure in a quest to achieve every objective?

Victory is measured by political success, too. Both Trump and Netanyahu are political animals, and both Israel and the United States have elections coming up in the fall. Trump and his team have repeatedly assured Americans that “we’ve won this,” but a CBS News-YouGov poll in early April indicated that only 36 percent of Americans thought U.S. military objectives had been met. Most Israelis believe the war has not achieved its objectives and oppose the current cease-fire.

What is the U.S. and Israeli escalation ceiling?

The United States has engaged in a massive air campaign against Iran, striking military forces, ballistic missile sites, drone production facilities, and numerous other targets—more than 13,000 in all. It has also blockaded Iran. Yet there is much the United States and Israel have not done militarily. The damage to Iran’s economy has been considerable, with key industries such as steel production devastated. And Washington has threatened to destroy Iranian power plants, which many observers consider a war crime. But destruction of Iran’s infrastructure has not been done in a systematic way.  Similarly, aside from a search and rescue mission for a downed U.S. airman, the United States and Israel have not deployed ground troops to Iran.

It is unclear when and how the United States or Israel might escalate further. Trump has not  followed through on his apocalyptic rhetoric despite the continued disruption of global energy markets. If attacks on Iran resume, will it be more of the same, or will the United States broaden both its target set and types of forces used?

Will the United States and Israel diverge?

The United States and Israel share many broad objectives regarding Iran, but they disagree on priorities. Israel, for example, cares about Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile program because these can target Israel directly (but cannot reach the U.S. homeland), while the United States is far more focused on the Strait of Hormuz.

The two allies are not in lockstep. When the United States declared a cease-fire with Iran, Israel was informed, not consulted. Israel, for its part, continued its strikes on Lebanon for several days, even though it risked disrupting the cease-fire. Domestically, Israelis are disappointed by the cease-fire in Lebanon and with Iran, while Americans welcomed it.

It is plausible, or even likely, that the United States may agree to terms with Iran that Israel opposes. This might include unfreezing Iranian assets, accepting limits on Iran’s nuclear program without eliminating it entirely, or otherwise leaving Iran wounded and angry—but not defeated. Israel, for its part, might conduct additional attacks on Lebanon or even Iran to keep it weak, leading Tehran to respond with additional pressure in the strait or target U.S. interests rather than striking Israel directly.

What does Israel expect in Lebanon (and does the United States care)?

Even as the Iran war has captured world attention, Israel has pursued a separate war—without U.S. military involvement—against Hezbollah. The latest round began when Hezbollah, responding to the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, launched missiles at northern Israel, displacing many residents there. In response, Israel has launched a ferocious campaign against the group in Lebanon, bombing its forces and strongholds throughout the country and creating a buffer zone in southern Lebanon along the border. At least 15 Israelis and more than 2,000 Lebanese have died in the fighting, and the war has displaced over a million Lebanese.

Israel is negotiating directly with the government of Lebanon and is demanding that it disarm and otherwise crack down on Hezbollah. But Israeli leaders know that the Lebanese government is not able to do so. Its armed forces are too weak, and Hezbollah, which at times has fought the formidable Israeli military to a standstill, would probably defeat them.

The United States has supported cease-fire negotiations, but it does not have a clear endgame in Lebanon. It, too, seeks for Hezbollah to be weaker, but it seems to favor building up the Lebanese government as a counterweight, while Israel is more wedded to military force to keep Hezbollah weak.

How long can both societies hold out?

The damage Iran has inflicted on Israel and the United States is a fraction of the devastation that Iran has suffered. Yet both countries have had their losses, and their staying power is questionable. Israel has been at war since Hamas attacked on Oct. 7, 2023. The focus of its wars has varied—Israel has struck Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the West Bank as well as Gaza and now Iran. Its people are exhausted and its economy stretched. So far, the Israeli public continues to support attacks, but the strain is real.

The U.S. strain is far less, but U.S. interests are also more limited. Americans, unlike the Iranian regime and many Israelis, do not see the conflict as existential, and most oppose the war. For Americans, the economic cost, particularly higher gas prices, is of most concern—an attitude that may lead the Trump administration to seek a quick deal to fully open the Strait of Hormuz and end attacks on energy, even if it goes against other U.S. and Israeli goals.

What is the long-term impact on U.S. alliances?

The war has been an economic disaster for many U.S. allies, most of which are far more dependent on imported energy. The fighting in Iran may cost the Asia-Pacific region hundreds of billions of dollars, while Europe is facing an energy shock. U.S. allies in the Gulf absorbed attacks on their people and infrastructure, with the United States unable to stop all of Iran’s strikes. Gulf leaders, like Israel, worry that Washington will leave Iran angry and eager for revenge.

Adding insult to injury, the United States did not consult its allies before going to war or otherwise try to build a coalition. When the war began to go pear-shaped, U.S. leaders then demanded that allies take on missions such as opening the Strait of Hormuz—something the  formidable U.S. Navy was not prepared to do.

Allies feel angry and betrayed. Even before the war many saw the United States as a destabilizing actor rather than a reassuring ally. But at the same time, the war highlighted the importance of U.S. military power. Allies in the Gulf, for now at least, have no alternative to U.S. protection if they seek to guard against Iran. European allies are finally expanding their militaries, but they have a long way to go.

It is easy in the moment to exaggerate crises—alliances always have ups and downs. At the same time, it is foolish to assume that this crisis, especially when it comes on the heels of diplomatic disasters such as Trump’s threats to invade Greenland, will pass with little impact.

The challenge for U.S. and Israeli leaders is not simply managing Iran but navigating their own ambiguous definitions of victory, unclear escalation thresholds, potential alliance divergence, and domestic and international constraints. For analysts and policymakers, the task is less to predict precise outcomes than to identify which uncertainties matter most and how they interact. The future of the conflict will hinge not only on capabilities and intentions but on how these unanswered questions are resolved—or left dangerously unaddressed.